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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The Appellant incorporates by reference the statement of issues 
for review in his Brief of Appellant, 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The Appellant incorporates by reference his statement of case as 
set forth in his Brief of Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
The Appellant incorporates by reference his statement of facts as 
contained in his Brief of Appellant. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Respondent's statements imputing criminal conduct to the Appel-
lant are slander per se whether or not the allegations could pertain to 
Appellant's personal or professional reputation. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
ALLEGATIONS OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT MAY PERTAIN TO 
EITHER PERSONAL OR PROFESSIONAL REPUTATION 
AND STILL CONSTITUTE SLANDER PER SE 
A s u p e r f i c i a l a n a l y s i s o f the facts in A l l red v. Cook, 590 P.2d 
321 (Utah 1979) cou ld e a s i l y lead one to b e l i e v e t h a t the f a c t s are 
s i m i l a r , i f not i d e n t i c a l to the f a c t s p r e s e n t l y be fore t h i s Cou r t . 
However, upon c l o s e r ana lys is , i t i s c lear that whi le the facts of A l l red 
are s i m i l a r i n appearance, i n r e a l i t y t h e i r s i m i l a r i t y i s i l l u s i v e , i f 
not n o n - e x i s t e n t . In A l l r e d , the P l a i n t i f f al leged that the Defendant's 
statements const i tu ted slander per se because they pertained to the P la in -
t i f f ' s f i t n e s s f o r h i s o f f i c e occupat ion or p r o f e s s i o n . In A l l red The 
P l a i n t i f f d i d not a l lege that the Defendant's statements were a l legat ions 
of c r im ina l conduct and thus slander per se. In the matter before the 
Court, the Appellant alleges not only that Respondent's statements per-
ta ined to the Appel lant 's o f f i c e or pro fess ion, but also that they are 
allegations of criminal conduct. 
In Al l red, th is Court held: 
" I n other words, i f the statements made are capable of 
two interpretat ions, one i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which might be 
re fer red to as professional reputat ion and one which 
might re fer to h is personal character , i t cannot be 
slander per se." 
Al lred v. Cook, 590 P.2d 318 at 320. 
The Court in A l l red required that where the category of slander 
per se being al leged is damage to one's of f ice or profession then i t must 
be clear from the statements or the context of the statements that the 
words apply only to the P l a i n t i f f ' s professional reputation. The Allred 
Court d id not have facts before i t nor did i t rule that an allegation of 
criminal conduct must apply only to P l a i n t i f f ' s professional reputat ion to 
cons t i t u te slander per se. An allegation of criminal conduct damages an 
individual whether i t applies to one's professional reputation or personal 
reputation. Therefore, under th is Court's guidelines such an allegation is 
slander per se. 
Respondents assert that even i f an allegation of criminal conduct 
was not a l leged, or before the Court in A l l r e d , the Court thought an 
a l l ega t i on had been al leged and, there fore , ruled on that basis. Aside 
from questioning the legi t imacy of t h i s Court 's analysis and ru le in 
A l l r e d , the assert ion is incorrect upon i t s face. The parties before the 
Court in A l l red c l ea r l y thought and demonstrated to the court that they 
were arguing over allegations pertaining to the Plaintiff's office or 
profession. The following statement in Appellant's Brief (from Allred) 
illustrates this: 
"Because of great public interest in education, state-
ments imputing inefficiency or lack of qualification to 
be a school teacher or school official tend to injure the 
teacher in his occupation or profession." 
Brief of Appellant at page 7; Allred v. Cook, 590 P.2d 321 (Utah 1979). 
Appellant's Brief in Allred is replete with references to the fact 
that Appellant thought that he was alleging that the Defendant's statements 
were slanderous per se within the category of affecting his lawful 
business, trade, or profession. Another example is found at page 8 of the 
Brief which states: 
"The alleged slanders are a per se, rather than per quod, 
because they pertain directly to the Plaintiff's fitness 
for his office and profession. The definition (suggested 
by Defendants in their memorandum in lower court) of 
slander that is actual per se are as follows: conduct, 
characteristics, or a condition incompatible with the 
exercise of a lawful business, trade or profession, 59 Am 
Jur, 2nd 524 §10 of Liable and Slander." 
In Allred v. Cook, the Plaintiff believed that the Defendant's 
allegations were slander per se, as they affected the Plaintiff's office or 
profession. To distinguish Allred from the facts of the present case by 
arguing that this Court was not aware of the facts it had before it, is not 
persuasive. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts from Allred are distinguishable from the facts presently 
before this Court. In Allred, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant's statement 
damaged his professional reputation. In the present case, Appellant 
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alleges that Respondents' statements damaged his office and professional 
reputation as well as accusing him of criminal conduct. Criminal conduct 
is a separate and distinct slander per se category. An allegation of 
criminal conduct damages one's professional as well as personal reputation, 
and is slander per se whether it can be attributed to ones personal or 
professional reputation. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this < ^ ^ §3y of December, 1985. 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
David 0. Black, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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